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Why
We Are Conservative
Dr. Donald J. Devine
Editor, ConservativeBattleline.com
Once
upon a time, not very long ago, there was no conservative movement.
Then, for a half century, it rose and grew ever stronger, finally,
to contest for control of the major American political institutions.
At the height of this climb, under President Ronald Reagan, powerful
liberal establishment observers could no longer ignore the movement
that had developed so quietly over the years, essentially under
the media radar screen. Yet, once Bill Clinton won the Presidency
and control returned to the Democrats, they wondered whether conservatism
had been a mirage. Conservative control of the House of Representatives
was declared a failure after 1995 and it was even said that George
W. Bush could not get elected without qualifying his conservatism
as "compassionate." Soon conservatives themselves, not
unaffected by this media buzz and the caution of their own elected
officials, doubted it all too. What had happened?
Before
the 1950s, there were no conservatives. There were traditionalists
and libertarians who opposed the dominant welfare state liberal
ideology, and there were Republicans who were "do it slower-than-the
Democrats,” moderates. But there were no conservatives in
the modern sense. Modern conservatism was invented at National Review
magazine in the mid fifties, primarily by editors, William F. Buckley,
Jr. and Frank Meyer. As befitting conservatism's positive view of
common sense and tradition, the new doctrine was not planned but
grew from the interactions of its creative but divided staff, which
needed some common ground from which to publish a coherent enterprise.
Meyer dubbed it "fusionist" conservatism. Its highest
value was liberty, but it was a freedom to be used responsibly as
a means to pursue traditionally defined and virtuous ends. The formula
was: conservatism equals relying upon libertarian means to pursue
traditional ends.
From
this formula flowed conservatism's support of Western values as
desired ends and opposition to both domestic statism and international
communism, as enemies of those ends. Judeo Christian morality, the
family, religion, local communities and national patriotism were
the values Meyer defined as Western. This also meant support for
means such as individual freedom, free markets, voluntary associations,
local governments, unfettered businesses--especially small businesses--and
capitalism generally. This formula inspired additional conservative
journals, new think tanks, the political action organizations, the
Goldwater take over of the Republican party, the Reagan successes
in limiting the welfare state, the Fall of the Berlin Wall and communism,
and--after a forty year hiatus--the 1994 majority in the House of
Representatives.
In
spite of this success, Bill Clinton was re-elected in 1996. Many
libertarian-leaning conservatives thought the problem was that the
GOP had leaned too far to the traditional end and developed amnesia
for the implicit consensus. The Republican National Committee chairman
at the time proposed that "we should talk about those issues
on which we all agree: limited government, low taxes and cutting
spending." But these were positions the traditionalists accepted
in return for libertarian agreement that traditional ends were the
goal. If there was not even to be discussion of social issues like
abortion, the family, education, faith and the culture, how could
virtue be recognized as the end, the goal? If the libertarians would
not openly acknowledge the legitimacy of the ends, even if achieved
by free means, no wonder traditionalists would seek payback when
conditions improved for them.
Sure
enough, when George W. Bush was elected in 2000 with strong support
from his fellow traditionalists, social conservative were more than
pleased to suggest and support national government programs to advance
their values. Yet, this attempt to write traditional values into
national law violated its implicit agreement to use market or at
least local government or community means to implement values rather
than using the libertarian nemesis--the national welfare state.
Opposition to abortion was a position libertarians had to accept
for the coalition to be created—and, it was coercion, after
all--but libertarians revolted at the No Child Left Behind nationalization
of education standards, national regulation of welfare eligibility
rules, increased funding of national abstinence-only contraception
and national anti gambling laws. Why are these issues that state
or local or private sources could not handle, they not unreasonably
demanded?
It is a fundamental truth of American politics, however, that it
is very unusual for any single ideology to gain a majority mandate
in a U.S. election. In the very diverse 21st Century America, it
is virtually impossible. Various voter groupings have been identified
by experts, but no one of them total to a majority, including "conservatives"
or moderates. The old, very useful Time Warner typology identified
a dozen groups, none of which represented more than an eighth of
the population. The consistent "libertarians" (Time called
them enterprisers) and traditionalists (called moralists) were the
two largest groupings, but they only represented 12 percent of the
population each. Even among the Republican primary electorate, enterprisers
represented only 34 percent and moralists only 33 percent. Neither
can win by itself, although together they could dominate the GOP
nomination process, which is presumably why they came together in
the first place.
Even
the broadest classifications of voter types do not find a majority
supporting any single one. Political scientist par excellence, Aaron
Wildavsky, identified four very broad political types: so called
individualists, deferentials, egalitarians and fatalists. Based
upon the Time Warner data, the first (which corresponds to economic
conservatives) represented 34 percent of the population, the second
(social conservatives) equaled 22 percent, egalitarians (liberals)
were 27 percent and fatalists 17 percent. On the basis of this division,
Wildavsky concluded that all politics must be coalition politics,
with no single one able to mold a reliable majority.
Interestingly,
Wildavsky claimed that the normal ruling coalition is the economic
social conservative one. They can cohere because they both basically
hold a positive enough view of human nature to not require a strong
central government to control a nasty human nature. The economic
conservatives view nature as actually benign, encouraging individualism,
experimentation, and entrepreneurship, believing that a "hidden
hand" will make everything turn out right. The social conservatives
are not so optimistic, but they do think nature can be at least
tolerant for human social life if institutions like the family,
church and community are vibrant. Both limit government in favor
of private institutions and differ from the egalitarians who view
nature as ephemeral and fatalists who view it as capricious--both
of which views require the strong hand of government to control
harmful nature.
Like
it or not economic and social conservatives are stuck with each
other, if they want to be in the majority--or at least if they do
not want a coalition of egalitarians and fatalists in control. To
even protect themselves from the governmental intrusions of the
egalitarian-liberal and fatalist-conspiratorial types on the left,
traditionalists and libertarians must respect each other’s
bottom line values. Economic conservatives must be explicit that
the traditional values are the goal, even if they stress more that
the means should be voluntary ones. Social conservatives must recognize
a difference between recognizing moral ills and the temptation of
translating their solution into national laws, even if they must
insist upon public discussion of the ultimate value-goals and their
solution by voluntary and local means. If both conservative factions
do not accommodate their natural allies, the other guys will determine
what the goals are and use national government means to enforce
them.
It
would be better to understand conservatism as more than a political
bargain--as a consistent fusionist philosophy. As non theistic,
economic conservative F.A. Hayek taught, both are necessary. Freedom
and markets cannot exist without a traditional, even religious,
social order to sustain them. As social conservative Russell Kirk
believed, the state is often the greatest threat to traditional
values and institutions. So there was a valid reason to "create"
modern conservatism. Libertarian means and traditional ends have
been the preferred historic formula for the great majority of both
economic and social conservatives. A serious review of the major
philosophers of tradition and liberty will find that the best in
each school believed both were necessary, even if they lacked full
belief in the traditional values themselves. Indeed, Western civilization
itself was and is a harmony of both. Not a simple uniform tune but
a harmonic masterpiece, not simple libertarianism nor univocal traditionalism
but both. That was the mix that created Europe and its offspring
and imitators around the world, very much including the United States.
Even
for traditionalists and libertarians who insist upon their own single
tune--and who cannot accept a conservative philosophical harmony--if
they want to be part of a governing majority, it is still rational
to accept some coalition. The one that can protect the interests
of both is the tested, Reagan one of libertarian means and traditional
ends.
The
price of a successful conservatism must be a gracious acceptance
of the traditional live and let live formula. If the modern scourges
of brutal egalitarianism and debilitating fatalism are to be transcended,
traditionalist and libertarian conservatives must learn again to
work together in bold harmony. That means a vigorous conservative
program based upon common principle. After the September 11 attack,
and the threat to both freedom and Western values it represented,
that unity is more required than ever. If we will not hang together,
we surely will hang separately.
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