Failed CIA Reform
by Donald Devine

With the 78-15 Senate confirmation of Gen. Michael Hayden as director of CIA concluded in record time, the bureaucracy has confirmed one of its greatest victories ever. In a mere 18 months, it defeated a serious effort at reform of that failed institution and installed the man who led the coup as Hayden’s key assistant.

Former Congressman Porter Goss was chosen by President George W. Bush a mere year and a half ago to sighs of relief that someone would finally shake up a bureaucracy notoriously wrong about international intelligence, missing every key event from forecasting that the Soviet Union could overtake the U.S. economically to 9/11 and Iraq. Upon Goss’ confirmation as CIA director on September 22, 2004, Senate Intelligence Committee chairman Pat Roberts called this “the most important changing of the guard for our intelligence community since 1947.”

It is all over now, with the man who worked tirelessly for reform gone and those who defied his efforts back in charge. The Directorate of Operations is supposed to be the backbone of the spy agency but was generally recognized as incompetent in the key covert and field functions. Worse, it was known for leaking information to the media, including a September 16, 2004 classified assessment of Iraq. When Goss’ chief of staff, Patrick Murray, informed counterterrorism section head Mary Margaret Graham on November 5, 2004 that one of the priorities of the new Goss team was to stop leaks, she took offense and complained to her supervisor, Michael Sulick, who informed the directorate head, deputy director of the CIA for operations, Stephen Kappes.

At a follow up meeting with the two superiors, Murray reiterated his opposition to leaks and Sulick reportedly called him “a Hill puke,’ reflecting his earlier service as a Congressional staffer. When Goss demanded that Kappes reassign Sulick outside Washington, Kappes refused, threatening to resign. Goss accepted his resignation and Sulnick followed. A Washington Post lead story immediately quoted a former director saying Murray “was treating senior officials disrespectfully” and other senior officials criticized Goss for “not interacting with senior managers.” The leaks continued until Goss was forced to resign by the White House.

It was a typical Washington bureaucratic power play. When long-time career diplomat John Negroponte was appointed as the new Director of National Intelligence to coordinate all such agencies including the CIA, the leakers had a new outlet for their backbiting that fit into the DNI’s desire to bring CIA under his control. Goss could not survive attack from above and below. Negroponte demanded his deputy Gen. Hayden replace Goss to guarantee his absolute control and the president either had to accept his ultimatum or admit he had made a mistake appointing the new DNI. It was powerful symbolism that Negroponte was the one who announced at the White House that Kappes was the leading candidate to become Hayden’s deputy.

While the president’s refusal to back Goss was understandable politically given his weak public standing, it played right into his enemys’ hands. His Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert was furious over Goss’ embarrassing removal. It was the ranking Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, Jane Harman, however, who had made the appointment of Kappes as a condition for her support of Hayden. The Kappes announcement led the former CIA executive director replaced by Goss, A.B. Krongard, to gloat that this was “an admission that it was a big mistake” to bring in Goss and his people in the first place. When former CIA deputy director John McLaughlin was asked whether this meant the CIA was back to business as usual, he replied: “I think that is basically an accurate assessment.”

President Bush’s whole government reform agenda has come under assault. His personnel reforms of the departments of Defense and Homeland Security are hopelessly tied up in court. Yet, the administration delays taking the bold steps necessary to implement them and defy the judges’ attempt to run the executive branch. The good news is that since the Congressional review period has now expired, the Federal Aeronautics Administration has courageously implemented its final air controller safety and personnel reforms and the Supreme Court has allowed some flexibility in disciplining recalcitrant government employees.

Whatever one thinks of the specific policies, bureaucrats cannot be allowed to run amuck on serious matters like spy operations, defense, homeland security and airway safety. The public would recognize this immediately if President Bush took the issue to the people boldly and explained its seriousness. The president and his appointees are supposed to be in charge, not dealt the death of a thousand knives by faceless bureaucrats as was the undeserved fate of a good man like Porter Goss.

Donald J. Devine is the editor of Conservative Battleline.

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