There is no question now that American policy in Iraq has hit a roadblock. Coalition Provisional Authority administrator L. Paul Bremer has put the best possible face on it by maintaining that the U.S. will still meet the sovereignty transfer to Iraqis deadline of June 30, 2004 but no caucus elections will be held. That means the Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani has won and holds the trumps for the remainder of the transfer.

The claim by the CPA that a caucus was essential because voter lists were unavailable for a direct election was a ruse, whose bluff was called by the Ayatollah. Al-Sistani, too, was hiding behind Bremer's and President George W. Bush's promise to bring "democracy" to Iraq-claiming direct elections were required to fulfill that promise. In fact, the CPA's caucus elections were proposed to give a regional balance to the new governing authority and the constitutional convention, to balance Al-Sistani's majority Arab Shia with a substantial bloc of Kurds and Arab Sunni. This did not escape the notice of the Grand Ayatollah.

The problem is starkly simple. Direct elections will lead to a Shia majority and Shia control. The Kurds, who have been de facto independent under the U.S. no-fly zone for years, will accept nothing less than federalism and, probably not less than autonomy guaranteed by militia forces, neither of which is acceptable to the Grand Ayatollah and his people. The Sunni, not just in Iraq but in the whole region, despise the Shia as heretics to Islam--and the feeling is mutual-and are determined not to live under their rule. Iraq has three separate peoples and there is absolutely no way to satisfy all three. The CPA is still trying to impose federalism and oppose Islamic law in the preliminary constitution or Basic Law. But after Al-Sistani's victory over the caucuses, it is difficult to see why he would allow this more fundamental threat to power for his Shia majority.

Ambassador Bremer told this reporter three months ago that federalism and division of power to protect minority rights were essential to a successful transition. The caucuses were the means to accomplish this. But, at the same time, one of the most moderate Shia leaders, Sayyad Farkad Quizwini, said the Iraqi majority (i.e., his Shia) would never accept a divided government. What now? The United Nations has been brought in to find a solution for creating a temporary Iraqi ruling authority but why should Al-Sistani accept this if he is not promised early direct elections leading to a Shia majority? The U.N. has now accepted the possibility of an election as early as the end of the year and even Bush Administration officials admit the interim U.S.-appointed Iraq Governing Council lacks the necessary legitimacy to govern for more than a few months.

The fact there were three distinct people with ancient grievances and conflicting interests was the reason the President's father set limited war aims that did not include administering Iraq after the first Gulf War. The son ignored the father's wisdom and is now paying the price, or at least our military and the Iraqi people are. Is the U.S. to dig in and impose a separation of powers regime or does it allow the Shia majority to rule over the others and ignore the consequences? Either solution will anger a minimum of 40 percent of Iraqis. Increased violence is inevitable. That is why Bremer is insisting on the June 30 transfer, to get as much out of harm's way as soon as possible before the civil war.

None of the plans call for a full U.S. withdrawal. Coalition military forces, at best, are to disengage from the population and withdraw to defensible fortresses. Bases in the Baghdad region will down from 46 to 8 by April, all outside the city. Direct reaction assignments are to be turned over to Iraqi forces and to the local police. Already, the massive U.S. troop rotation-at 200,000 the largest in U.S. history--has substituted smaller replacement units for larger ones, decreasing the military "footprint." Yet, U.S. incursions into the populations are inevitable and all three peoples will attempt to draw in Coalition forces to their advantage. The U.S. and its allies could be caught in the middle of this morass for years.

The neoconservative Weekly Standard contends the only course is for the Bush Administration and the Pentagon to stop deluding themselves that "the current pace of operations in the greater Middle East is an anomaly rather than the new norm. They seem not to have grasped the most basic fact about American foreign policy since 9/11-that the United States is promoting a new order in the region." While denying that this implies "endless military campaigns," the editors admit that "Afghanistan and Iraq are the beginning, not the end" of operations. An "open-ended occupation of Iraq" is being resisted by U.S. military leaders, they say, when the military should be demanding a substantial increase in spending and a much larger force even than the recently announced temporary increase to prepare for an indefinite occupation.

Former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger agrees that "a new phase of involvement" by the U.S. and the international community is necessary in Iraq but says the fundamental issue is "secularism vs. Islamism." Yet, he also admits that with the elimination of the Baathists, it will be very difficult for the U.S. to find secular "domestic partners" against militant Islam. He even concedes "there is no comparable experience in Iraq" for separation of powers, making the best long-term solution the least likely one. But the problem is broader still. If the Shiites are denied full control, they could ally with their co-religionists in Iran, creating a much, much larger regional problem. Or the Kurds could rebel and provoke a Turkish invasion. Kissinger even raises the unmentionable, if "far from the preferred outcome," the most likely one: "a breakup into three states…imposed by events," hopefully under some international guidance to avoid spilling into the whole region.

This truly would fully commit the U.S. to protracted involvement in the "greater Middle East," as the neoconservatives wish, but not in the business of democratization except possibly after an extensive regional war-Turkey and Iran, after all, have real armies--and a long occupation. Even then would Congress support the necessary spending for a military force sufficient to democratize the region, if that is even possible, which Kissinger suggests it probably is not? Would a John Kerry administration and a new Congress be more willing or less?

The U.N is now supporting early elections. Actually, democratization and early direct elections is the most cynical solution. This would hand full power to the Shia and provoke civil war. But the interregnum might provide for an honorable exit. To prepare for this requires an even greater acceleration of the planned U.S. military disengagement, and a quick exodus immediately after the Iraqi election to avoid the inevitable chaos, exercising as much guidance as possible on the way out without being drawn into an open-ended quagmire among peoples determined not to live in peace with each other.

By Editor