Iraqi Vote Maps Partition

It turns out the optimists were correct about democracy in Iraq. Only they did not tell us it would be Chicago-style.

It took a full ten days for the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq to report the results from the October 15 referendum on a new constitution, where two-thirds of the voters in three provinces were required to defeat it. The preliminary numbers were leaked a week before but they were so conflicting that the IECI was forced to impound the results and do an audit because of what its Commissioner Adil Al-Lami called “unusual numbers.”

Iraqi election officials first leaked to the U.S. Associated Press that the constitution was not only approved where expected in the Kurd and Shiite regions (by 90 percent) but also in the Sunni Ninevah and Diyala provinces that were expected to have large numbers opposed—indeed approved by “strikingly powerful ‘yes’ votes of up to 70 percent.“ In contrast, other anonymous officials told the British Reuters news service that 53 percent rejected the constitution in Niniveh and told Agence France Presse that 54 percent opposed it in Diyala, an unusual discrepancy even by Chicago standards, certainly justifying a recount.

In announcing that 79 percent had approved the charter based on a 20 percent audit, IECI election official Farid Ayar claimed they found “no cases of fraud that could affect the results.” Al-Lami said the IECI had received only 100 minor complaints. Yet, Saleh al-Mutlaq, a prominent Sunni leader and one of the few of his sect on the constitutional committee, had told the AP at the time of the vote that the manager of a polling station in Diyala informed him that a Kurdish district cast 39,000 votes although only 36,000 were registered—right out of the Chicago playbook. While the charge could not be confirmed, when the vote was announced al-Mutlaq called the results “a farce” and accused government forces of stealing ballot boxes to reduce the “no” vote in the Sunni-Arab provinces. “The people were shocked to find out their vote is worthless because of the major fraud that takes place in Iraq,” rather guaranteeing that after the whole chaotic and extended process, Sunnis will not accept the results. Another Sunni leader, Hussein al-Falluji, was more blunt, warning ominously, “The situation can only get worse now,” after a week in which over 100 were killed.

The results showed that Anbar voted “no” by 97 percent and Salaheddin by 81 percent, meeting the required two-thirds. But Niniveh reportedly voted “no” by 55 percent and mixed and contested Diyala apparently by 49 percent. While that would adopt the charter according to the rules, the results could not be worse. The anti vote was not enough to defeat the charter but just enough to question its legitimacy. The Sunnis in three provinces have inconvertible proof that a majority of its people will be ruled under a constitution they opposed and believe, like al-Fallufi, was forced upon them by a foreign occupation while in the fourth they will be convinced the vote was stolen from them. In the understatement of diplomacy, UN envoy Ashraf Qazi commented, “The results of the referendum have indicated the degree of political polarization in Iraq.” This will not look like democracy to Sunnis, to say nothing about being perceived as fairly administered or properly arrived at.

Even if accepted as legitimate, the vote on the constitution dramatizes in hard numbers in no uncertain terms the deep sectarian division of Iraq, as well as points to its likely future. The three Kurdish areas voted for the charter overwhelmingly, the four majority Sunni provinces (and certainly the Sunnis in them) voted against it and the remaining eleven Shiite regions supported it almost unanimously. By coloring in the three voting patterns, it is unmistakable that anti-charter Sunnis divide the nation east to west, from border to border, with unified Kurds separated to the northeast and the majority Shiites to the south. The borders of the three separate nations could not be more well defined nor, unlike the U.S. red/blue division, could not run deeper.

The Kurds, backed by the strongest and longest established local armed forces, are already de facto independent of the central administration and threaten to go their own way entirely if the Baghdad authorities try to limit their powers. One close Kurd advisor promised that, if the constitution failed, the Kurds would move directly to independence. The Shiites have 60 percent of the population and are happy to rule either from the center as a majority or in their large southern region. Since they have their own sources of oil for revenue and would not have to share it nor power with the Kurds or Sunnis in a decentralized or separate state, most are now thinking autonomy would not be a bad idea. In a crisis, they could also ally with their fellow religionists in adjoining Iran. The Iraq armed forces and police in both areas are drawn almost exclusively from their own religious and ethnic ranks and would not even notice a change from national to federal to independent status. The military partition of Iraq is already a fact.

The ones left out are the Sunnis, and not only in oil, which has been promised but not guaranteed. The armed forces in their midst are either the U.S. military or staffed by one of their two historic enemies. Of course, the jihadists and Baathists operate from there too, and someone needs to control them. But the vote makes clear the Sunni opposition goes far beyond the active insurgency. For those not actively involved, the fact they are controlled by outsiders must cause distress. In the recently acclaimed joint U.S.-Iraqi military action into Tal Afar to control Sunni terrorist forces, the successful lead “Iraqi” troops were almost exclusively Kurdish. Media interviews with these soldiers just before the battle made clear that their high morale to a great extent resulted from the fact they were told they would be fighting their historic oppressors, the Turkomen (Sunnis).

Both Kurd and Shiite leaders have already called for U.S. troops to withdraw from their regions but to stay to ride herd on Sunni terrorists and malcontents. As time goes by, it will be clearer and clearer that the U.S. mission has become the suppression of Sunni nationalism in Iraq. Since 85 percent of the Islamic world is Sunni, this will become increasingly apparent and objectionable to U.S. allies. President George W. Bush has said U.S. troops will remain until Iraq is stable or even becomes democratic. With the magnitude and location of the Sunni opposition now precisely measured by the vote against the constitution, it is now crystal clear how long that would take, perhaps as long as--but infinitely more dangerous than--reforming Chicago.

Donald Devine, Editor.

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