Something Is Missing In Meyer’s Traditionalism
by Daniel Larison
Mr. Meyer's
classic discussion of Western civilization continues to be interesting,
but as I read it a few weeks ago and then again this week I was
struck by the sense that something vital was missing. The foundations
of Western
civilization that Mr. Meyer elaborated are familiar to readers of
Russell Kirk's work, and for the most part there is nothing particularly
objectionable about Mr. Meyer's argument about Greece and Israel.
What
is lacking almost completely in Mr. Meyer's description of Western
civilization, and what lends the whole piece its disquietingly Popperian
flavor, is the neglect of any mention of the crucial period of synthesis
in the church and in Christendom as a political and cultural world.
Like most Western civilization courses, and not unlike Mr. Popper's
ideas, the essential bridges of medieval Europe in history, Christianity
in culture and the Incarnation in reality are either ignored all
together or reduced to the metaphor of the "flash of eternity
into time" and the idea of respect for the individual.
More generally,
it is questionable whether Western civilization is properly defined
by the supremacy of the individual. Personality, as opposed to individuality
(a vital, but often elusive, distinction that has been admirably
explained by Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, among others), as an ontological
concept and as a living reality derive their meaning from the theology
of Trinitarian communion, such that personality exists, is realized
and has meaning in relation to other persons. 'Personalism' thrives
in a society of people of different status and a variety of occupations,
ideally being raised up in a common tradition, combining differences
to complement one another.
Individualism
is the breakdown of traditional orders and inherited customs that
are supposed to constrain and limit the self (but which, I would
say, facilitate the expression of a man's personality), and paves
the way for the inevitable collectivism of the state and majoritarian
tyranny. Culturally, it breeds a type of person given to fads, novelty
and the advertising gimmicks that appeal to the appetites rather
than the intellect, sentiment or faith, and so also encourages the
fragmentation of the libertarian maintenance of tradition. It is
for these last reasons that a libertarian maintenance of tradition
seems so untenable to some conservatives. It sounds appealing, but
neglects certain realities about human nature.
Individualism
takes what is a most excellent political truth--that each person
does possess God-given rights that cannot be rightfully infringed--and
turns it into the cultural and religious heresy that social, moral
and religious constraints are likewise more or less arbitrary impositions
on individual liberty. This lack of attention, or indeed hostility,
to the sources of order in society brings us to the sorry situation
of facing both Leviathan and moral anarchy, the latter now actively
encouraged by the political class to enhance its own power (which
Mr. Francis has correctly called anarcho-tyranny). This is an unfortunate,
but also quite intentional, product of the Enlightenment project
and classical liberalism itself.
Mr. Meyer writes:
"In radical contrast, the vision of the West, splitting asunder
the transcendent and the earthly, placed their meeting point in
tension, in the souls of individual men. The individual person became,
under God, the ultimate repository of meaning and value."
In effect,
what Mr. Meyer described as the defining characteristic of the West
is, in many ways, the heart of the uprooting of Western tradition
and the separation of individuals from the cultural roots of conservatism
that Mr. Meyer argued to preserve. Mr. Meyer was careful here to
keep a hold of the sovereignty of God, which is very good, but it
is not at all clear that human affairs can be directed to anthropocentric
ends and defined around the individual while continuing to hope
that these will somehow all comport with what must properly be,
if God is sovereign, a theocentric existence. Each person does have
tremendous native dignity, being in the image of God, but once that
dignity itself becomes the definition of a philosophy, rather than
the expression of the source of that dignity, then this philosophy
makes an idol of man in ways similar to the contemporary liberalism
it must combat.
Finally, I recall
that the respected historian, Maurice Cowling, speaking specifically
of British Conservatives, explained that liberty (actually, he used
the word freedom) may be very important to the conservative vision
of society but liberty is not primarily what
conservatives are seeking. (This is not, by the way, in any way
a call to rally around some dreadful interventionist central state
serving ostensibly moralist goals.) The preservation of liberty
is, I think, essential to the virtues and traditional society that
conservatives are seeking, but in putting it first we are liable,
as C.S. Lewis observed in another context, to lose it all together.
Having said
all this, I am keeping in mind that Maurice Cowling also argued
some time ago that there is no necessary connection between political
conservatism and Christianity. Let us assume for the moment that
he is correct. It still seems to me that if conservatism is committed
to the preservation of Western civilization, and this civilization
is inescapably
defined by its Christian heritage and the Christian mediation of
the Greek and Jewish inheritances, then a conservative vision for
society cannot be radically at odds with Christian definitions and
hope to remain coherent and convincing.
Response: Meyer’s Traditionalism Is
Complete
by The Editor
Daniel Larison
has done it again. If possible, this week he has topped his stellar
performance in the last issue expounding upon paleoconservatism.
The serious issues he raises about Frank Meyer demand a response.
As with his previous contribution, Mr. Larison has added to the
debate and to my own understanding of the outstanding issues. Let
me address his concerns. In sum, he argues that Meyer overvalues
individualism and undervalues historical Christendom in his rendering
of Western civilization.
Let
us start with the place of the individual for Meyer in Western civilization,
which Larison characterizes as questionably “defined by the
supremacy of the individual.” Rather, Larison argues, “
Individualism is the breakdown of traditional orders” that
are “supposed to constrain and limit the self.” “A
libertarian maintenance of tradition” sounds appealing but
seems untenable. Individualism turns to the heresy that religious
truths are arbitrary. Liberty is important but the problem with
individual freedom is “putting it first,” which leads
to both anarchy and tyranny.
Mr. Larison
quotes Russell Kirk favorably as an opposing view. Yet, as the Kirk
piece this week makes clear, that great traditionalist did not see
individualism necessarily resulting in the breakdown of traditional
order but maintains that both individuality and traditional orders
were necessarily in a “balance,” or as Meyer says a
“tension” or a fusion. Moreover, Kirk writes that the
maintenance of tradition comes from individuals and churches, a
libertarian means, not from authority. As Mr. Larison notes, the
problem is putting liberty first, which Meyer does not do—his
whole philosophy balances liberty and tradition. Neither liberty
nor tradition is supreme but both are subservient to the individual,
who is subservient to his Creator. Larison even quotes Meyer in
placing the individual “under God”—removing freedom
from the power of this world and placing it unalienably above power
to preserve it—but he will not concede that makes liberty
(and tradition) second.
Mr. Larison’s
real concern is that Meyer’s use of God and His Incarnation
are merely “metaphor” rather than real human history.
To some extent, his concern may come from the fact that the Meyer
piece as printed last issue was an edited version of a longer piece.
In an unprinted part of the article (the full article is available
at acuf.org/principles/p_westernciv), Meyer makes it plain. Western
civilization “founded itself, in its utmost core, on acceptance
of the tension between the transcendent and the individual person
and on the reconciliation of that tension implicit in the great
vision of the Incarnation—the flash of eternity into time.”
Time is reality, history, not metaphor and the reconciler is superior
to what it reconciles. This is not arbitrary imposition upon individuality
but the justification for it.
As far as ”the
neglect of any mention of the critical period of synthesis in the
church and Christendom” are concerned, another not-excerpted
section read: “In their thought, Christian men could never
fully divinize the state; and in practice they early created two
sets of tensions…Those two sets of tensions were, on the one
hand, the separate centers of power represented by the Church and
secular political power—empire or monarchy—and, on the
other, the broad decentralization of secular power inherent in the
feudal system.” The difference is that Meyer did not believe
that Western civilization was fully realized in Europe, even in
Medieval/feudal Christendom, because liberty then, although stronger
than in ancient times, was still too restricted. Following Acton,
he argues that it was not until Western civilization reached America
that it was fulfilled (especially in colonial Maryland and Pennsylvania
and then in the Constitution), and, even then, had many limitations.
As Meyer concludes, the struggle for Western civilization “continues
to this day and is not yet decided.”