Real Iranian Revolt
by Donald Devine
Issue 135 - July 8, 2009

Some very significant things are happening in Iran and the most important may not be occurring on the street. The crowds and protests have dissipated in the face of the police crackdown but events are moving forward even more dramatically behind the scenes. An analysis by George Friedman at the intelligence blog Stratfor even insists “There was no democratic uprising of any significance in Iran.” The crowds were turned out by factions within the regime that are battling for control.

The two major coalitions are informally headed by President Mahmud Ahmadinejad and former (1989-1997) president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, continuing their match-up from the 2005 election in which the former was triumphant. Rafsanjani had planned to run again in this election but deferred to Mir-Hossein Mousavi, perhaps under pressure from Supreme Leader Ali Hoseini Khamenei who above all wanted to avoid the instability that would result from a repeat contest between the two hostile rivals. The country was split anyway, with Rafsanjani and parliamentary Speaker Ali Larijani publically backing Mousavi, who most probably lost the election but gained enough votes to make a protest credible.

As strange as it sounds to Westerners, in this battle the incendiary Ahmadinejad is the reformer, with wide support among the poorer masses against the ruling elite. While more middle class Tehran gets the media attention and sympathy, the urban poor and rural areas have the votes. Ahmadinejad especially plays on Rafsanjani’s immense wealth as one of Forbes’ richest in the world and the privileges of the top clergy generally to stoke the fires of resentment. They, in turn, saw an Ahmadinejad victory as a threat to their very survival, although both sides say they support the institutions of the regime as opposed to the incumbents. So far, Ahmadinejad has kept on top, with the support of Khamenei.

The Supreme Leader, however, also has to deal with Rafsanjani, who is a survivor and, most significantly, is chairman of both the powerful Assembly of Experts and the Expediency Discernment Council. One report from Iran (not Stratfor) claimed that Rafsanjani had 40 signatures of Assembly of Experts members on a letter calling for the annulment of the disputed election. There are only 86 members, so this was just shy of a majority. His determination is demonstrated by the fact his own daughter was arrested (and then released) protesting the elections.

There are considerable restrictions on media freedom and religion in Iran – Baha’i is persecuted, Judaism and Christianity are somewhat tolerated – but, especially in the cities, control is usually not overbearing and some overt opposition is allowed, as the election proved, although highly regulated. Like Turkey, Iran is very unusual for an Islamic nation in having a working separation of powers. There is not only a separation between legislative, executive and judicial but, critically, there is a separation within the executive too. Executive power is shared between the Supreme Leader and the President but both of these are supervised by three committees that have very significant checks on them – the Experts Assembly, the Expediency Council and a Council of Guardians of the Constitution.

To both America’s founders and supporters of freedom from Montesquieu to Lord Acton to F.A. Hayek, separation of powers is more important even than elections for the long run. While 60 percent of the world holds elections, only a few dozen countries divide power and are really free. As seen in Iran, elections can be manipulated - but separate powers can always check each other producing some modicum of freedom as factions appeal to the people. Contrary to much nonsense and media ignorance, Iran is not a “dictatorship.” Iran’s supervisory committees have important powers. The Guardians interpret all laws to decide whether they are constitutional, like the U.S. Supreme Court (which of course is not elected either), scrutinize candidates for office for support of the constitution, and supervise elections, which, of course, the American high court did in Bush v Gore in 2000.

Rafsanjani’s Experts are elected and have the responsibility like an electoral college to select the Supreme Leader, who is chosen for life. But the Council of Experts can impeach him. That makes Rafsanjani and his 40 allies very relevant. As chairman of the Expediency Council, Rafsanjani also leads an institution responsible for supervising the actions of all three branches and which also most importantly settles differences when the Experts and Guardians cannot agree. He is an ayatollah himself and in fact went to seminary with Khamenei. There is very much a balance of power between Ahmadinejad the outsider, Rafsanjani the establishment, and other competing factions.

Were Khamenei and Ahmadinejad to ignore rulings by the supervising committees, it would undermine the “divine sanction” that gives legitimacy to the whole regime. Impeachment by the Experts would become a serious possibility. Some argue the committees are figureheads – but that is precisely what was said about the Soviet Central Committee just before it ousted Chairman Nikita Khrushchev. Real institutions count. Even if one could magically introduce democracy in Iran, if this eliminated the separation of powers it might not even be a net long term gain. Only one-fifth of Islamic nations are democratically elected and none are free. It is unlikely Iran will be the exception, especially considering that most (but by no means all) of the protestors were simply functionaries of one faction or another.

President Barack Obama initially took the proper response of nuanced neutrality, being sympathetic to the voters and protestors but careful not to be seen as a provocateur. Unfortunately, he could not withstand domestic pressure and started talking tough, saying he was “appalled and outraged” - beginning the very day Khamenei announced Obama had promised him U.S. neutrality before the election - perhaps to drive that story off the front pages. What is clear is that any change will have to come from within Iran. Even the bellicose Wall Street Journal rejects “military confrontation” with Iran. So what is left? The Journal proposes “taking every opportunity to apply consistent pressure on Iran while exploiting its internal tensions and contradictions.” But this played into Ahmadinejad’s hand when he then did blame the “interventionist policies” of the U.S. for inflaming the demonstrators so he could label the Rafsanjani forces as U.S. agents and undermine their legitimacy.

Empty words are worse than useless. Iran is more than twice the population of Iraq and there is little chance Mr. Obama will back words with military action to redress the election results, and the mullahs know it. Tough words only create a scapegoat for Ahmadinejad to rally his troops and the undecided. Why should the U.S. be assisting Ahmadinejad? True, Rafsanjani is no George Washington. The nukes and support for Hezbollah and Hamas will not go whoever prevails but Rafsanjani, Mousavi and Larijani are more realistic and more likely to be less provocative than Ahmadinejad.

President Obama should get serious and stop trying to be all things to all people. No perfect solution is possible. Unlike Eastern Europe, there is very narrow support for a Western democracy. Loyalty to faction, tribe and religion count. Mr. Obama should quietly let events in Iran unfold and maybe say a prayer or two that the poor people of Iran may come out of this a bit better than before. All Iranian factions see themselves surrounded on two sides by U.S. military forces. After things settle down, it might be possible to give guarantees that would allay these fears and reduce the possibility of reaction from this otherwise inward-looking power.

In the meantime, the best course is to speak softly and keep the big sticks and tough words for when they are truly required. Boning up on Ronald Reagan’s nuanced, although at the right moment blunt, language even when confronting the Soviet Union might just be the right primer for the new president while he is restraining his tendency to talk too much.

Donald Devine , the editor of Conservative Battleline Online, was the director of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management from 1981 to 1985 and is the director of the Federalist Leadership Center at Bellevue University.