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Comments on the Abu Ghraib Scandal
Editor:
Your editorial on the Iraqi prison scandal was a superb skewering
of Political Correctness run amok. General Karpinski -- who General
Taguba said couldn't evenget her soldiers to salute - was interviewed
by Bill O'Reilly, who sat there like a pottedplant while she offered
an un-interrupted, three-minute ramble of excuses. John Connolly
Editor:
As one who will probably support President Bush, I wonder how many
Americans are watching the Congressional hearings? As a Republican
politician, I feel that the prisoner abuse scandal will not sink
the presidency of Bush but that the performance of Rumsfeld, Meyers
and the under secretary for intelligence would. If seen by enough
Americans would doom the Bush administration. I might add the performance
of most of the Republicans on the Armed Forces committee was juvenile
and lacked any sophistication--and would also help in sinking the
Bush administration Being a Geezer gives one time to watch these
hearings. Tim Sullivan
Editor:
P.C. strikes again. Unwillingness to replace or discipline a female
officer has led to a P.R. disaster. We are fighting a war with one
hand tied behind us. A large percentage of our population doesn't
know that we are in a serious war about our survival. And some of
those who do know are so keen to get back into power that they don't
care how much damage they do to the country. Donald W. Bales
Editor:
I rather think that you missed the point. It was quite intentional
for the military to use women soldiers to provide "severe cultural
humiliation" to the prisoners at Abu Ghraib. As has been pointed
out many times by others, Arabs are very tough people and hard to
crack. Humiliation of this kind is about the only form of pressure
that has been shown to make them crack and provide information.
I think that you need to remember one thing: Abu Ghraib is not a
criminal prison in an otherwise peaceful country; it is a POW prison
in a war zone. The people kept here were not arrested under civil
law by civilian authorities; they were captured by soldiers in combat.
They are being interrogated not to determine guilt or innocence
but to gain information to protect our soldiers and save American
lives. If humiliation is all that they suffer in the course of extracting
this information from them, they should thank whatever God they
worship - we could very well do far worse.
The other point is the abuse of prisoners beyond
the requirements of interrogation, the apparent failure of the chain
of command (in this case) to make the line plain and to communicate
that line to the lowest levels, and the apparent enjoyment of certain
guards in humiliating prisoners. I say apparent because it has been
stated that at least some of these photographs and videos were staged
in order to provide "incentive" to other prisoners. If
in fact the set bounds were passed, if the chain of command failed
to properly supervise the guards, or if the chain of command was
broken then people should be punished. However, in the media in
general I have failed to see any distinction between legitimate
interrogation techniques and torture, or of the fact that civil
criteria for the treatment of prisoners do not necessarily apply
here.
Paul
Blasé, Alexandria, VA
Editor:
I read your opinion piece with interest because I too [a retired
Navy Captain] believe the embarrassing incompetence of BG Karpinski
was a substantial factor which led to the sad events of detainee
abuse in Abu Ghraib. More importantly the understandable reluctance
which I am sure existed in effectively dealing with the problem
her incompetence or shortfalls created complicated and probably
detrimentally influenced effective command action her superiors.
I differ substantially with your view and that of Congresswoman
Wilson that the matter of operational control of the Abu Ghraib
prison--the infamous Frag order placing the Military Intelligence
unit in tactical command of the Abu Ghraib complex--was a key issue.
That has been widely mischaracterized in my viewpoint, specifically
by Congresswoman Wilson at last Friday's hearing.
It is not only not axiomatic but contrary to what I experience in
a 24 year career that the assignment of operational control of units
who are co-located in one geographical location or even within a
given operational area bears any responsibility for failure to follow
standing orders, or to violate Army doctrine or whatever is the
sad excuse raised by BG Karpinski. That the Military Intelligence
Battalion/unit was placed in "tactical command" of the
Abu Ghraib base is without significance for the dereliction of duties
by the MP Battalion located there. Repeating for emphasis, a Frag
order assigning a unit as tactical command cannot and does not confer
any authority to that unit over normal functions and responsibilities
of another unit except for tactical/operational matters. If that
was NOT so then military officers would as a matter of course be
making medical decisions for medical units co-located in their complexes
or within their operational areas!
I can go on with examples, many from my personal operational experience
in Vietnam where as a Seabee Operations Officer I routinely and
repeatedly placed numerous detachment, big and small, under the
operational/tactical control of units we were supporting. The detachments
responded to the operational control of the on-scene unit commander;
conformed to his rules of engagement; and otherwise followed his
tactical command without impact or influence on their internal operations
and command authorities. Any breach of discipline would have been
referred to our Battalion as a matter of course, etc, etc, etc!
Moreover that relationship mirrors what was done when my Battalion
landed with the Marines at Chu Lai in May 1965. It did so under
the operational command of the Marine Expeditionary Force Commander--an
assignment made by Frag order although Navy/Marine lingo differed
from that. But most importantly that limited command relationship
did not confer control of the internal orders or procedures of our
Battalion to that Commander, nor would he have claimed it did!
Therefore I will not be distracted by nuance over tactical control
when the bottom line was the profound command failure of BG Karpinski.
The key element is the consequence of that failure and particularly
the role played by her gender as you conclude. I agree with your
conclusion that probably because of her gender her superior's chose
to ignore or to "work around" her failings in hope the
consequences of those failures and weaknesses, or the "work-arounds",
would be less distressful and potentially distractive than would
doing the proper thing and removing her from command for cause.
You imply this decision was made at Central Command. I had assumed
the decision was vested with LTG Sanchez. It is possible both views
are correct, or that as Task Force Commander LTG Sanchez's charter
was directed towards operational command of supporting units with
management/administrative command retained at CentCom by the 3 star,
LTG David McKiernan, Commanding General---get this, ARMY CENTRAL
COMMAND and COMBINED FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND who was the appointing
authority for the investigation performed by MG Taguba. Ergo what
exists in Iraq under the Task Force structure headed by LTG Sanchez
is a classic "matrix organization"---not unlike what I
experienced in two tours in Vietnam!
Whatever was that command relationship, and whoever was BG Karpinski's
reporting senior, it is essential the issue of command decision
making and the role, if any, played by BG Karpinski's gender be
fully explored---for therein resides the potential for future problems
unless that "boil" is lanced, and exposed in public.
Moreover there are rumors of a recommendation for a 4th star for
LTG Sanchez, which will require Senate confirmation---better this
issue be clarified before that happens or alternatively the Pentagon
better be prepared to defend his role, if any, in the Karpinski
matter. If the decision to retain Karpinski was ultimately made
by Sanchez, I believe that disqualifies him for a 4th star, period!
I appreciated your article but I believe follow-up is required in
defining the command relationship and where or who had responsibility
for retaining BG Karpinski as Brigade Commander of the 800 MP Brigade.
The buck rests there!
Jerry Dunn, Greenville, SC
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