Protect Us From Terrorists Not Pilots
By Steve Lilienthal

One of the government's promises following September 11 was a law adopted in 2002 requiring the newly formed Transportation Security Administration to arm pilots to resist terrorist demands to hijack aircraft. "The armed pilot is the first line of deterrence, and the last line of defense against terrorist attacks on airliners in flight," said Captain David Mackett, the president of the Airline Pilots Security Alliance, in urging support for the legislation.

Two years later, only a small percentage of flights are covered by Federal Air Marshals and expanding them to cover all commercial flights would be too costly. The airport screeners cannot do the job either. "Airport security is like a sieve," says Mackett, a Boeing 737 captain, ticking off incidents such as the one in the fall of 2003 in which Nathaniel Heatwole, a college student, was able to smuggle box cutters onto commercial planes, and even e-mailed the TSA to point out the gaping hole in their air security, only to have his messages ignored until some of the items he'd brought aboard were found.

Arming pilots is the only real solution, and not just from the standpoint of cost-efficiency. The pilot is the commander of his craft in the same way a passenger liner's captain exercises authority over his ship. Each and every day, commercial passenger and cargo airline pilots demonstrate the sound judgment and sense of responsibility required to fly expensive, technically complicated airliners. They take their responsibilities seriously. Pilots, in fact, have to undergo extensive psychological testing in order to fly commercially, and many have previously served their country in the military.

"Very few professions are as well-trained and closely observed and watched as airline pilots," notes Mackett, detailing how the FAA, the airlines, the air traffic controllers and the fellow pilots all closely watch and evaluate pilots who have spent years preparing for their jobs.

Yet the Transportation Security Administration is resisting the law. After two years, the Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) program has been effectively shut down, thanks to TSA's recalcitrant bureaucrats who have thrown up a variety of regulations and restrictions. The TSA and other bureaucratic agencies have made it clear through their statements and actions that it is their belief the public needs protection from the pilots who fly them to their destination, not from hijackers.

The TSA requires redundant psychological testing of pilots who demonstrate their sound judgment by flying commercial planes day-in, day-out and who have taken similar tests to obtain their pilot wings. Airline pilots by personality tend to be decisive, quick-thinking, sensible and, outside of dealing with air traffic controllers, impatient with bureaucratic hurdles. So it is understandable that they would have little patience for the TSA's psychobabble and all the other hurdles in place that have diminished the interest of pilots in participating in the program.

The fact is that the best, most effective defense against a terrorist, who has penetrated the porous passenger and luggage screening and the data system, is magnum force, wielded by a person in whose hands the passenger has already placed his life, the airline pilot. In a choice between a bureacrat and a pilot the choice should be clear to anyone other than another bureacrat.

Steve Lilienthal is Director of the Center for Privacy and Technology Policy at the Free Congress Foundation.